Urumqi, the capital city of the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. Screenshot from the video ‘Beautiful Xinjiang, China | Muslim Area | Urumqi City | A Paradise on Earth’ from EaziLine International YouTube channel. Fair use.
The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR) in western China became known to the world through reports about the so-called “re-education camps,” in which the authorities held hundreds of thousands of local residents. Uyghurs, Kazakhs and representatives of other Turkic and Muslim ethnic groups were tried for any connections with Islam. The Chinese authorities have portrayed the region as a source of instability and danger, citing separatist and terrorist threats, which enabled them to justify carrying out large-scale repressive measures against the local peoples. Since the end of 2016, the situation in the region has remained critical.
According to the 2018 Human Rights Watch report, even though there had been repressions of Muslims of Turkic origin in XUAR before, a sharp escalation began at the end of 2016. Then, the former secretary of the Communist Party in Tibet, Chen Quanguo, was transferred to Xinjiang. After his relocation, Quanguo introduced a policy of forced assimilation, in the process of which locals were detained under the pretext of fighting the “three forces of evil”: terrorism, extremism and separatism.
Having studied data from the XUAR prosecutor's office, HRW found out that between 2017 and 2021, almost 10 percent of the population — 540,826 people — were prosecuted in the region. Most of them are still in prison. However, in 2019, many of the extrajudicial detention camps were gradually abolished. In the last couple of years, the region has seen “liberalization” with external controls weakening and the Chinese authorities actively organizing demonstrative visits, primarily for diplomats and journalists from Muslim countries.
Global Voices spoke with Ivan Petrov (name changed for security reasons), a cultural expert from Belarus living in Southeast Asia, to discuss with him the different approaches Chinese authorities have employed to pacify the region in the last eight years. Petrov visited XUAR twice, in 2019 and 2023. The interview has been edited for brevity and clarity.
Global Voices (GV): What struck you the most in Xinjiang during your visit in 2019?
Иван Петров (ИП): В 2019 г. меня поразила невероятная система надзора. Города были поделены на сектора, на каждом перекрестке – отделение полиции. От перекрестка до перекрестка по улицам медленно фланировали полицейские машины или даже броневики. На улицах также установлены металлические заграждения. Едешь на машине, останавливают, проверяют содержимое багажника, и кто сидит в салоне.
Во всех общественных местах, типа парков и рынков на входе – сканеры документов и лиц. В обычных магазинах, ресторанах, аптеках – рамки-металлоискатели, дежурят охранники. Даже при входе в некоторые жилые кварталы такие же металлоискатели. По улицам ходят тройки полицейских, вооруженных щитом, дубинкой со штыком и рогатиной с электрошокером. Останавливают молодых ребят, проверяют содержимое их телефонов.
При въезде в любой город – блокпост с проверкой документов. Если с тобой какая-то проблема, тебя могут не выпустить из твоего города и не впустить в другой.
Из того, что еще удивило по сравнению с фотографиями десятилетней давности – все мужчины молодого и среднего возраста гладко выбриты, женщины без религиозных платков.
Ivan Petrov (IP): I was amazed by the incredible surveillance system there. The cities were divided into sectors, with a police station at each intersection. From intersection to intersection, police cars and armored vehicles slowly drove along the streets. Metal barriers were installed on the streets. Cars were stopped to check the contents of the trunk and see who is sitting in the cabin.
In all public places, such as parks and markets, there were document and face scanners at the entrance. In regular stores, restaurants, and pharmacies, there were metal detectors and security guards on duty. Even at the entrance to some residential areas, there were metal detectors. Three police officers armed with a shield, a baton with a bayonet, and a slingshot with a stun gun walked the streets. They stopped young men and checked the contents of their phones.
When entering cities there were checkpoints with document checks. If there was a problem with you, you may not be allowed out of your city or allowed into another.
What was also surprising compared to the photographs of 10 years ago was that all the young and middle-aged men were clean-shaven and the women were without religious headscarves.
GV: How much has the region changed in the last three years? What differences did you notice during your visit in 2023?
ИП: К моему великому удивлению, ничего этого в 2023 г. уже не было. Исчезли блокпосты между городами, сканеры лиц в парках и рынках, пункты досмотра. Я спокойно проехал на такси в Опал к могиле знаменитого филолога XI в. Махмуда Кашгари, к которой в 2019 г. меня просто не пустили на блокпосту, сказав, что дорога закрыта.
Посетил город Яркенд, а в 2019-м меня в нем даже не выпустили с железнодорожного вокзала. В Яркенде, правда, чувствовался надзор – при выходе из поезда меня зарегистрировали полицейские и спросили, с какой целью я приехал, а в самом городе за мной по пятам ходил какой-то человек в штатском, но все-таки мне удалось попасть там во все те места, куда я хотел.
Другое отличие – в 2019-м многие таксисты и владельцы общепита не говорили по-китайски. В 2023-м все они уже свободно изъяснялись на путунхуа. Я даже видел детей, которые друг с другом говорили не по-уйгурски, а на путунхуа.
В целом, видимо, ускоренная и усиленная программа ассимиляции сработала, и власти ослабили узду. Но справедливости ради надо отметить, что эти языковые меры касаются не только уйгуров, а всех малых народов.
По всей стране в последние годы школьное образование ведется только на официальном государственном языке путунхуа, а не на языках национальных меньшинств. Жители четырех автономных районов Китая – монголы, уйгуры, чжуаны и тибетцы – обучаются не на своих языках, а на путунхуа. Так что дальнейшее существование разнообразных языков и основанных на них национальных культур под вопросом.
IP: To my great surprise, in 2023, I saw none of the stuff from 2019. Checkpoints between cities, face scanners in parks and markets, and security checkpoints had disappeared. I calmly took a taxi to the town of Upal to visit the grave of the famous philologist of the 11th century, Mahmud al-Kashgari. In 2019, the authorities simply did not let me in at the checkpoint, saying that the road was closed.
I visited the city of Yarkant, and in 2019, they didn’t even let me out of the railway station. In Yarkant, however, there was a feeling of surveillance. When leaving the train, the police registered me and asked for what purpose I had come, and in the city itself, a man in civilian clothes followed at my heels, but I still managed to get into every place I wanted to go.
Another difference is that in 2019, many taxi drivers and catering owners did not speak Chinese. In 2023, all of them were already fluent in Mandarin. I even saw children who spoke to each other not in Uyghur but in Mandarin.
Overall, the accelerated and intensified assimilation program appears to have worked, and the authorities seem to have loosened the reins. In fairness, it should be noted that these language measures apply not only to the Uyghurs, but to all national minorities in China.
Throughout the country, in recent years, school education has been conducted only in the official state language, Mandarin, and not in the languages of national minorities. Residents of the four autonomous regions of China — Mongols, Uyghurs, Zhuangs, and Tibetans — are taught in Mandarin. So the continued existence of various languages and national cultures based on them is questionable.
GV: To what do you attribute these changes in Xinjiang? Have the Chinese authorities achieved their goal?
ИП: Я думаю, тут несколько факторов. Один, как я сказал, сработала программа ассимиляции. Другой, возможно – личный. Раньше Синьцзяном руководил переведенный из Тибета Чэнь Цюаньго, там он осуществлял похожую политику. А сейчас его сменил ученый и технократ Ма Синжуй из более либеральной провинции Гуандун.
Еще один фактор – давление Запада, на которое Китай был вынужден отреагировать. Как мне говорили знакомые уйгуры, программа лагерей, куда людей отправляли без суда и следствия, отменена. Большую часть закрыли, а оставшиеся переформатировали в тюрьмы. Теперь туда заключают по формальным причинам.
Ну и наконец, Китай решил развивать туризм в Синьцзян. Нужно показать, что это благополучный регион. А как это сделать, если на каждом шагу проверки – блокпосты и пункты досмотра? Ведь этим утомительным проверкам подвергались и туристы-ханьцы. Так что пришлось отретушировать картинку.
IP: I think there are several factors here. One, as I said, is that the assimilation program worked. Another reason is perhaps personal. Previously, Xinjiang was led by Chen Quanguo, who was transferred from Tibet, where he implemented a similar repressive policy. Now, he has been replaced by a scientist and technocrat, Ma Xingrui, from the more liberal Guangdong province.
Another factor is the Western pressure which China was forced to respond to. As Uyghur acquaintances told me, the program of camps where people were sent without trial have been cancelled. Most of them were closed, and the rest were reformatted into prisons. Now people who are sent there are imprisoned for formal reasons.
Finally, China has decided to develop tourism in Xinjiang. It is necessary to show that this is a prosperous region. How can this be done if checkpoints and inspection points are at every step? After all, Han Chinese tourists were also subjected to these tedious checks. So the authorities had to change the picture.
GV: It seems as if people in Xinjiang are no longer imprisoned on an industrial scale. However, what will happen to the 500,000 people who were imprisoned earlier and are not likely to be released?
ИП: Отпустили тех, кто находился в лагерях без приговора и на взгляд властей встал на путь исправления. Тем же, кому не посчастливилось попасть в жернова судебной системы, никто не собирается пересматривать обвинения, часто ужасающе смехотворные.
Так, например, на много лет сажали женщин за то, что они изучали Коран в детстве, 50-60 лет назад, или приговаривали к пожизненным и длительным срокам заключения редакторов одобренных государством учебников, по которым до того велось преподавание в школах всего Синьцзяна. Эти люди, как правило воспринимаются как глубоко религиозные верующие или национально ориентированные интеллигенты, надолго или навсегда изолированы от общества.
IP: I think they will remain in custody. Those who were in the camps without a sentence and, in the opinion of the authorities, took the path of correction were released. For those who were not lucky enough to get caught up in the judicial system, no one is going to reconsider the charges, which are often terribly ridiculous.
For example, women were imprisoned for many years for studying the Quran as children 50–60 years ago. Editors of state-approved textbooks, which were previously taught in schools throughout Xinjiang, were sentenced to life and long prison terms. These people, as a rule, who are seen as deeply religious or nationally oriented intellectuals, are isolated from society for a long time or forever.
Read also Global Voices’ Special Coverage: Documenting state-directed persecution of minorities in China's Xinjiang region
Written by Global Voices East Asia
This post originally appeared on Global Voices.
