The Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs gizmo of terrorism

PARIS: Mr. Mohammad Hossein Adeli, former Iranian ambassador to Japan, Canada, and then Britain, said,

“Foreign policy (of Iran) arising from the Islamic Revolution that was an idealistic foreign policy and has maintained this origin to this day.”

The slogan of Khomeini, the Islamic Republic founder, was, *War until the end of sedition in the world.”*

Clearly, this slogan shows the entirety of Khomeini’s belligerence ideology derived from medieval religious dogmas. In the 21st century, Khomeini’s regime cannot meet its people’s cultural and economic needs. Using external war, exporting terrorism, and creating a crisis in the region, the regime covered the inability to care for the Iranian people with distractions meant to sustain its power and control.

“Since the victory of the revolution, foreign policy has been largely based on acute issues, These acute issues include the U.S. embassy hostage situation, the Mykonos incident, the death of Zahra Kazemi, the beginning of a nuclear case based on documents (disclosured by ) Monafeghine (monafeghine means hypocrite is the name given by Iranian regime to its sworn enemies, the Mujahedeen), and the backlash against human rights resolutions. After that, there was a vortex of resolutions in Ahmadinejad’s government, but none brought about real change. So far, it does not seem that the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic has entered into a normal course, but always have followed and acted in accordance with the solution of a more acute issue.” says Adeli.

In other words, the Iranian regime’s foreign policy has followed its terrorism and the resolution of the issues arising from it in the international arena. Hence, many members of the regime’s embassies and diplomats have been prominent members of the regime’s Ministry of Intelligence.

In December 2018, the Albanian government expelled the Iranian regime’s ambassador and another embassy member. That same year, the Netherlands expelled two Iranian diplomats in connection with terrorist plots.

However, the Paris attempt in 1998 is one of the finest examples of the regime’s foreign policy and how the regime’s foreign ministry implements its policies, serving its goals through terrorism. This particular conspiracy targeted Iranian opposition leader Maryam Rajavi and her Pro-European-American supporters in France’s 2018 plot.


Read more from Hamid Enayat on CDN

Due to the vigilance and collaboration of three Belgium, Germany, and France countries, this threat was neutralized. On July 1, 2018, the German police arrested the Iranian diplomat, Assadollah Asadi, on Highway 3 in Aschaffenburg, Germany, on a European arrest warrant.

Just a few hours earlier in Brussels, Belgian police arrested two terrorists who had explosives received from Asadi,

Without a doubt, if this conspiracy had not been defused, we would have faced a much greater tragedy than French Bataclan. Before that incident in 1998, there was another terrorist action against Rajavi in Germany involving the Iranian regime.

According to the New York Times, American security officials were quoted on June 25, 1995 as saying that Iranian diplomats based at the Iranian embassy in Bonn had a plan to assassinate Mrs. Maryam Rajavi at a gathering of Iranians at Dortmund, Germany, in 1998.

Who is the on-duty diplomat assassin commander in Villepinte?

The state-run Kayhan newspaper writes that Assadollah Asadi was a man who took part in the devastating Iran-Iraq war and had specific training in the field of explosions and destruction. After the end of the war, in 1988, he entered the regime’s intelligence office in Khorramabad.

Thus, he has been working in the regime’s Ministry of Intelligence for more than 30 years.

In 2004, Asadi was appointed the third secretary of the regime’s embassy in Iraq, which he held for 4 years. Asadi is still the third secretary until arrested two years ago. Conclusion this situation makes it very clear that the third secretary rank was a cover for his central mission: terrorist activity. Typically, a third secretary is promoted to the second secretary after a few years of service.

From 2005 to 2008, he worked as an intelligence officer at the Iranian embassy in Iraq for about four years. His mission in Iraq was to strike at the Iranian opposition based in Iraq.

Asadi was a high-ranking official of the Ministry of Intelligence whose mission was to work against the Iranian opposition from the beginning of his entry into the Ministry of Intelligence. As the state-run Kayhan newspaper writes, he worked against the Iranian opposition on his record before joining the Foreign Ministry. In 2014, Asadi transferred to the regime’s embassy in Vienna, Austria.

In June 2018, Asadi flew to Tehran and picked up the bomb.

He transported it to Vienna in a diplomatic suitcase on an Austrian OS872 passenger plane with 240 other people. Then he handed it over to the assassins, who were the Ministry of Intelligence’s cold cells for years. Asadi, as the mastermind and commander of this terrorist operation, and three other members of the assassination team, are currently being detained in Belgium on charges of plotting a terrorist act. Their hearing is scheduled for November 27, 2020.

This plot involved the regime’s entire diplomatic apparatus in a major terrorist operation for the first time. In previous assassinations, members of the Ministry of Intelligence only used diplomatic passports, but they were not active diplomats in these countries.

For instance, an Iranian dissident was killed in Switzerland by a terror team with diplomatic passports on April 24, 1990. The judge in charge of the case later stated,

“The investigations concluded that 13 people all holding same date issued diplomatic passports marked ‘on a mission’ were involved in this matter.” (The International Herald Tribune, November 22, 1993.)

He also indicated the involvement of one or more official Iranian services in that assassination.

Another example was the explosion of the Argentine Jewish Center, where the prosecutor’s investigation showed the Iranian regime’s highest officials’ involvement.

Conclusion

During the last three decades, the Iranian regime’s assassinations in different countries are carried out in a suitable context of inaction and appeasement with the Iranian regime. Experience has shown that Europe was not a hotbed of the regime’s terrorist diplomats or the rise of Islamic fundamentalism whenever the regime was dealt with firmly.

The assassination of four Kurdish dissidents at a restaurant in Mykonos Berlin in 1997, when a court convicted the regime leaders involved in the crime, prompted all European countries to recall their ambassadors from Iran, suspending the regime’s relationship with Europe for six months. As a result, the regime did not carry out terrorist acts in European countries for several years.

Europe’s security is achieved by determining to end the terrorism of this regime.

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